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Abstract
This paper examines how optimal renewable energy (RE) support (RES) poli-
cies need to be adjusted to account for carbon prices. We show theoretically
and empirically that changing carbon prices requires adjusting RE production
subsidies due to two different motives: First, RE premiums need to be reduced
to reflect the carbon value embedded in the market price. Second, RE premi-
ums and feed-in tariffs need to be adjusted once a fuel switch away from coal
towards gas power occurs. This adjustment is necessary to account for changes
in the marginal external benefit of RE. For the case of the UK, we estimate the
optimal RE subsidies and their adjustments due to a fuel switch. Furthermore,
we use numerical simulations to analyze the impact of varying carbon prices
on optimal RES. We show that the necessary adjustment due to a fuel switch
is empirically rather small, whereas RE premiums must be phased out with
increasing carbon prices due to the increasing reflection of the carbon cost in
the electricity market price. Finally, a fuel switch increases solar-induced abate-
ment, whereas it wind-induced abatement is rather invariant to a fuel switch.
Yet, the differentiation of RE subsidies between wind and solar power is modest.
Keywords: Renewable promotion, Carbon pricing, Electricity generation
JEL: Q41, Q42, Q58
1. Introduction
Greenhouse gases from electricity generation are a main driver of man-made
climate change. To achieve decarbonization of the power sector, two major
regulatory approaches are used. Carbon pricing and renewable energy sup-
port (RES) subsidizing renewable energy (RE) generation. Although from an
economist’s perspective a price on carbon emissions is the preferred instrument,
RES historically gained greater political support. Nevertheless, carbon pricing
is becoming more and more popular leading to an increase of emissions covered
(Worldbank, 2020) and increasing carbon prices. As an example, prices in the
European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) increased from below 5 e/tCO2
in 2017 to over 25 e/tCO2 in mid 2020. Increasing carbon prices in a regula-
tory setting with high RES raise the main question of this article: How does
RES need to be adjusted once external cost of carbon emissions are increasingly
priced?
Carbon prices and RE generation reduce emissions through different chan-
nels: Carbon pricing policies alter the relative cost of fossil generation. This can
change the ordering of power plants along the supply curve, i. e., lead to a switch
from (dirty) coal to (cleaner) gas generation. RE promotion incentivizes invest-
ments in carbon-neutral technologies. Once installed, they produce electricity
at near zero marginal cost and replace fossil generators with high marginal cost.
At the same time, there are interactions between the two instruments.
In this paper we investigate the interactions between RE support and carbon
pricing policies along two main questions: How does a carbon price change the
emissions impact of wind and solar generation? What are the implications
of carbon prices for the optimal support of RE generation? To address these
questions, we first analytically derive (i) the impact of carbon prices on the
emission offset of RE and (ii) the optimal RE support in a world with carbon
prices. We then empirically estimate the impact of a fuel switch from coal to
gas generation on RE-induced abatement and derive the change in optimal RE
subsidies. Finally, we use a numerical model to analyze the impact of increasing
carbon prices on RE subsidies.
From a theoretical perspective, the magnitude of abatement induced by one
unit of RE generation, i. e., its environmental value, is not fixed, but given by the
carbon intensity of the marginal plant which is replaced. This, in turn, depends
on carbon pricing policies which can change the ordering of power plants along
the supply curve. In other words, a carbon tax makes coal-fired generation more
expensive, while gas-fired generation becomes relatively cheaper. Consequently,
there is a possible interaction between the emissions impact of the RES and
carbon pricing policies: If a carbon price is sufficiently high to induce a fuel
switch, i. e. change the marginal generator, it changes the environmental value
of RE generation.
However, RE-induced abatement not only depends on the merit order, but
also on time-varying demand. More specific, the point of intersection between
the supply and the demand curve determines the marginal generator and con-
sequently marginal emissions. Given that wind and solar are—due to their dis-
tinctive availability profiles—producing during different demand periods, they
differ regarding their emissions impact, which is also differently affected by a
carbon price.
To analyze the impact of carbon pricing on optimal RE promotion, we ana-
lyze two different policies: premiums and feed-in tariffs. Callaway et al. (2018)
and Abrell et al. (2019c) show that optimal feed-in tariffs reflect the emissions
avoided evaluated at the social cost of carbon as well as avoided operating cost.
In contrast, the optimal RE premium reflects only the value of avoided external
cost. In this paper, we extend these analyses deriving the impact of carbon
prices on RE subsidies. We find that introducing or increasing carbon prices
requires adjusting RE promotion due to different motives. First, RE premiums
that are paid on top of the market price need to be adjusted to reflect the in-
creased carbon value embedded in the market price. An increased carbon price
leads to an increased reflection of external cost in the market price. Thus, the
optimal RE premium needs to be decreased to grant a subsidy equal to the
remaining external cost avoided, i.e., the marginal external benefit net of the
external cost already priced. Such an adjustment is not necessary in the case
of a feed-in tariff as RE production is not exposed to the market price. Second,
both—RE premiums and feed-in tariffs—need to be adjusted once a fuel switch
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occurs. This is necessary to account for the change in the marginal external
benefit of RE sources induced by the change in the merit-order curve.
The empirical analysis focuses on the change in marginal emission offsets
of wind and solar power induced by a fuel switch. We estimate the impact
for the UK power sector, which implemented extensive RES schemes and at the
same time imposed an additional carbon tax, the so-called Carbon Price Support
(CPS), on top of the EU ETS. This price in combination with decreasing natural
gas prices induced a fuel switch away from coal-fired power plants. For the
analysis, we use a rich data set of the years 2015 and 2016 of the UK power
market with hourly generation and capacity availabilities, daily coal, gas, EUA
and CPS prices, and daily mean temperature. To estimate the impact of wind
and solar on coal and gas generation, we use a regression model which allows
the coefficients to vary between two different fuel price regimes: During the
cheap coal regime coal generation is on average cheaper than gas, during the
fuel switch regime gas generation is on average cheaper than coal. We then use
the estimated impacts on fossil generation to calculate the change in abatement
impacts as well as optimal feed-in tariffs and RE premiums.
We make three main observations. First, we find that carbon prices increase
solar-induced abatement by around 8 %, whereas wind-induced abatement re-
mains constant. For both technologies, the impact on the differentiation of
optimal subsidy payments between RE is rather small. Second, external cost
reflected in the market price substantially reduce optimal RE premiums to less
than half of the marginal external benefit. Third, feed-in tariffs for wind and
solar need to be adjusted by a decrease of less than 8 % due to a fuel switch. In
contrast, optimal premiums increase by about 8 % for solar and remain constant
for wind, corresponding to the change in abatement.
Our estimation allows to calculate the impact of a fuel switch on optimal RE
subsidies. As carbon prices are relatively stable in our sample, we additionally
use a numerical model to analyze the impact of varying carbon prices on optimal
RES. The numerical model mimics the UK wholesale market depicting each
coal and gas-fired plant and clearing the market for each hour in the sample.
Holding natural gas and coal prices constant at their level at the beginning of
our sample period, we simulate the impact of increasing carbon prices. This
allows us to analyze adjustments of optimal RES solely caused by an increase in
carbon prices. We show that the adjustment of feed-in tariffs due to an increase
in the marginal benefit of RE sources is relatively modest. In contrast, RE
premiums must be phased out with increasing carbon prices. The reason is that
due to the reflection of carbon cost in the electricity market price, RE receive
the (increasing) carbon value through the price. Increasing carbon prices thus
reduce the optimal RE premiums and eventually make them redundant.
Our results are relevant for the political debate about increasing carbon
prices in the electricity sector. First, our analytical results imply that when
RE promotion is designed using premiums, an increase in carbon prices requires
decreasing premium rates. As with increasing carbon prices external costs are
increasingly reflected in the market price, a smaller part of the external benefit
of RE promotion needs to be granted using premiums. This is also confirmed
by our empirical results, which show that the reflection of the carbon tax in the
electricity price reduces optimal premium payments by more than half compared
to a situation where we do not account for the carbon value reflected in the
market price. Second, our results imply that changes in the merit-order curve
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lead to a change in optimal RE premiums and feed-in tariffs. However, we
estimate these adjustments to be rather small. The same is true for the optimal
differentiation of subsidies across RE sources: Given that the heterogeneity of
the marginal emission offsets across RE sources is rather modest, the required
differentiation is small.
With our analysis we contribute to three related strands of literature. First,
there is recent literature on the optimal design of RES policy. Abrell et al.
(2019c) derive optimal RE premiums and feed-in tariffs in the absence of carbon
pricing. They find, that from a theoretical perspective optimal RE subsidies
should be differentiated to reflect the different environmental effectiveness of RE
sources. Yet, in an empirical simulation model for the German power market,
this differentiation turns out to be small. Callaway et al. (2018) show for the
US that the variation of environmental effectiveness is small within a region but
varies substantially across regions. They therefore propose to differentiate RE
and energy efficiency subsidies across regions. Abrell et al. (2019b) and Lamp
& Samano (2020) extend these arguments in the presence of storage facilities
avoiding curtailment of RE sources and for ancillary service market incomes.
The existing studies analyze the design of RE policies in the absences of carbon
prices. We add in two different ways: On the one hand, we theoretically derive
how optimal feed-in tariffs and premiums need to be adjusted in the presence of
a carbon price. On the other hand, we quantify the necessary adjustments for
the case of the UK. We show that the differentiation of optimal RE subsidies
due to different production profiles and changing marginal external benefits is
small, but the necessary adjustment of RE premiums to reflect the carbon value
in the electricity market price is substantial.
The second strand of literature assesses the impacts of either carbon prices or
RE promotion on fossil generation and emissions. For example, Cullen (2013),
Kaffine et al. (2013), Novan (2015), and Abrell et al. (2019a) analyze the en-
vironmental effectiveness of renewable support. However, these studies do not
take into account the variation of the emission offset of RE production due to
changes in relative fuel and carbon prices. Cullen & Mansur (2017) use the
variation in gas prices to infer the impacts of a carbon price on fossil genera-
tion, but do not assess the environmental effectiveness of RE sources. We follow
the approach of Cullen & Mansur (2017) using fuel price variations to identify
the changes in the merit-order curve, and contribute to the existing studies by
looking at the interaction of both policies, i. e., carbon pricing and RES.
Third, there is a growing literature on the interaction of climate policies in
the power sector. Most studies focus on the interaction of RE policies with
emission trading systems through their impacts on carbon prices (see, e. g.,
Abrell & Weigt, 2008; Böhringer & Rosendahl, 2010; Gonzalez, 2007; Böhringer
& Behrens, 2015). The general argument is that RES schemes lead to a reduced
demand for emission allowances and therefore a decrease of the carbon price,
which in turn favors dirty technologies such as coal. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there are only three studies analyzing the impact of RE generation on
emissions for different fuel price regimes: Weigt et al. (2012) use a simulation
model of the German power market to analyze the interaction of carbon prices
and the environmental effectiveness of RE promotion. Holladay & LaRiviere
(2017) look at the interaction of relative fuel prices and RE-induced abatement
in the US power sector. They exploit the variation in gas prices during the shale
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gas boom to distinguish between two fuel price regimes.1 Fell & Kaffine (2018)
analyze the impact of lower gas prices and higher wind generation on coal gen-
eration and emissions in the US electricity market. They look at both impacts
individually as well as their interaction. They find that lower gas prices lead to
a substantial increase of wind-induced abatement. The first part of our analy-
sis on the impact of relative fuel prices on RE-induced abatement is similar to
these studies. In addition, we contribute by using and comparing two different
methods, i. e., numerical simulation and empirical estimation, and by going one
step further and additionally add on the optimal design of RES policies in the
presence of carbon prices.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we
derive optimal RE subsidies in the presence of carbon prices and how these sub-
sidies need to account for changes in carbon prices. In Section 3 we present the
background on RES and carbon pricing in the UK followed by a description of
our estimation strategy, numerical modeling approach, and data used. Section
4 shows the empirical results how optimal RES needs to be adjusted for fuel
switching. Section 5 analyzes the impact of varying carbon prices in RE pro-
motion based on the numerical approach. Section 6 summarizes and discusses
our results and finally concludes.
2. Carbon Prices and Renewable Energy Promotion
In this section, we first explain the impact of introducing a carbon price on
the emission offset of RE production. Afterwards, we examine the implication
of introducing a carbon price on the optimal promotion of RE generation in
form of a production subsidy.
2.1. The Interaction of Carbon Pricing and the Emission Offsets of Renewable
Energies
The impact of RE production on emissions in the power sector depends on
two major factors. First, production profiles determine at which point in time
the respective RE source replaces fossil production. Second, the emission rate
of the marginal power plant, the marginal emission rate (MER), determines the
decrease of carbon emissions induced by RE production in a particular hour.
The production profile depends on the availability of natural resources, and thus
is independent of carbon prices. A carbon price does, however, impact the MER
by altering the marginal cost of power plants, and thus the ordering of fossil
power plants along the supply curve.
Following Callaway et al. (2018), we express the production profile of natural
resource r as the share of total production realized in period t, ωrt, which sums
up to one over the whole time horizon from t = 0 to T (
∑T
t=0 ωrt = 1).
2 Given
the production profile, the average marginal emission offset, δEr , i. e., the amount
1Holladay & Soloway (2016) estimate the impact of the fuel price spread on fossil gener-
ation and emissions. While we use a similar method, we differ with respect to the research
question: They focus on the direct effect of fuel prices on generation and emissions, while we
are interested in the indirect impact of relative fuel prices via their impact on RE.
2ωrt expresses how many percent of total production is realized in hour t. As an example,
if resource r produces 1 GWh in period t and 1000 GWh over the whole time horizon, ωrt
would be 0.1%.
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of emissions on average avoided by one unit of production of the respective RE





Carbon prices can affect the marginal emission offset in two ways: First, they
alter the relative cost—and possibly the order—of power plants in the merit-
order curve. As the supply curve together with demand for electricity determines
the marginal plant, carbon prices can alter the MER. Second, whereas carbon
prices do not affect the production profile of the RE source itself, they affect
the correlation of RE generation with marginal emission rates.
IMPACT OF CARBON PRICE ON THE MER—–At first glance, one might expect
that a carbon price leads to a decrease of the average MER, as it drives carbon
intense power plants out of the market. Yet, this has not to be the case. Consider
a system in which demand in all hours is constantly at the high level in Figure
1. The marginal generator then switches from a gas to a coal plant in all hours,
leading to an increase in the average MER. The impact of a carbon price on the
average MER is thus a priori unclear.3
Figure 1 illustrates the dependence of the MER on the introduction of a
carbon price and demand. Panel (a) depicts a situation without a carbon price.
In this cheap coal situation, carbon intense coal plants are dispatched before
gas-fired plants. The MER is thus decreasing in demand. Introducing a carbon
price alters relative cost of coal and gas power plants. Coal generation with low
operating cost but high emissions is then driven to the right of the supply curve.
In the extreme, a full fuel switch takes places and all gas plants are dispatched
before coal-fired plants as shown in Panel (b).4 The MER then increases in
demand.
IMPACT OF CARBON PRICE ON CORRELATION OF MER AND RE PROFILE—
–The second part that defines the emissions impact of RE is the correlation
of the MER with the RE production profile. This profile effect differs across
RE resources. Figure 2 depicts the mean hourly production of wind and solar
power together with mean demand. It becomes evident, that solar production is
correlated with high demand hours whereas wind production seems to be only
slightly positively correlated with demand.5 The change from the cheap coal
to fuel switch regime (induced by a carbon price) leads to a higher MER rate
in high demand hours. As solar production coincides with these high demand
hours, the fuel switch increases the covariance effect of emission offset for solar
power. For wind power, the effect is ambiguous as wind production occurs
during low and high demand hours.
In summary, it is a priori unclear whether increasing carbon prices lead
to a higher or lower emission offset of RE production. In the case of solar,
we expect that a carbon price induces higher abatement, as carbon intensive
3Note, however, that this does not imply that the carbon price does not decrease emissions.
In contrast, as in the example all gas plants are dispatched first, total emissions decrease but
the MER increases.
4The carbon price of 70 e /tCO2 has never been observed in the data but is chosen here
for illustrative purpose to achieve two merit-order curves completely separated by technology.
5Over our sample period the correlation between demand and solar (wind) is 36% (10%).
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Figure 1. Merit-order curves for cheap coal and fuel switch situation
(a) Cheap coal
(b) Fuel Switch
Notes: Shown are merit-order curves for the UK electricity system based on fuel prices on 30
June 2016. The coal (gas) price was 7.5 (13.9) e/MWhth. For sources of power plant capacities
and heat efficiencies see Appendix B. The resulting marginal costs are measured on the left
axis. Demand (black lines) refers to demand net of production of base load technologies. The
marginal emission rate (blue line) is measured on the right axis. Cheap coal in Panel (a) refers
to a situation with a zero carbon price. In the Fuel switch situation in Panel (b) a carbon
price of 70 e /tCO2 leads to a completly separated merit-order curve in which gas plants are
dispatched first.
coal production is more likely to be marginal in high demand hours when solar
generation peaks. In the case of wind, which has no pronounced daily production
profile, the impact of a carbon tax can go in both directions.
2.2. Implications for Optimal Renewable Promotion
Optimal RE promotion equates the average marginal income of RE produc-
ers with the average marginal economic value (MEV) (see Callaway et al., 2018;
Abrell et al., 2019c).6
6Once the RE facilities are installed the production profile is exogenously determined by
resource availability and cannot be changed. Thus, the income stream is determined and aver-
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Figure 2. RE production and demand profiles



































Notes: Shown are hourly mean wind (green) and solar (orange) production (measured on the
left axis) and hourly mean demand (black, measured on the right axis) for our sample period
from 2015 to 2016. See Appendix B for data sources.
We consider two major forms of RE promotion in the form of production
subsidies which differ in terms of their marginal income. First, feed-in tariffs
grant a production subsidy to RE sources, sFITr , but these sources do not re-
ceive the market income.7 Second, RE premiums grant a production subsidy,
sPremiumr on top of the market income.
MARGINAL ECONOMIC VALUE—–The MEV of RE sources includes two main
components: Cost avoided as conventional plants are replaced and the marginal
external benefit (MEB).
We consider the cost avoided as the operating cost ct net of carbon cost.
Callaway et al. (2018) also include the value of avoided capacity cost. This is
relevant for RE sources active in peak hours, as these might avoid installing
additional peak-load capacity. However, during our period of analysis, the UK
established a capacity market that excluded RE sources. We thus assume that
RE sources do not replace conventional capacity.8
We assume the MEB to be equal to the social cost of carbon emissions
avoided: MEB := SCC · δEr = SCC
∑
t ωrtMERt, i. e., we evaluate the carbon
emissions avoided at the social cost of carbon (SCC).9
age marginal values provide the incentive to invest into the facilities to provide an additional
unit of RE production.
7One possibility is that the regulator or transmission system operator brings the RE pro-
duction to the market and receives the market income that is used to partially refinance
subsidy expenses.
8Including a capacity value would likely increase subsidies for solar power, as it is mostly
active in peak load hours and thus likely to avoid larger amounts of capacity.
9We concentrate on the marginal external benefit in terms of avoided carbon emissions
which are the major emission component avoided. Also, we abstract from learning externalities
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FEED-IN TARIFF—–Under a feed-in system, RE producers receive only the
production subsidy and no further income.10 The average marginal income
therefore equals the feed-in rate sFITr and the optimal feed-in rate becomes:





+SCC · δEr︸ ︷︷ ︸
MEBr
. (2)
In each period, operating cost net of the cost for carbon emissions of the marginal
generator, ct determine cost avoided. The MEB equals the average marginal
emission offset evaluated at the social cost of carbon.
To see how the optimal feed-in s∗FITr changes with the introduction of a













Introducing a carbon price, the optimal feed-in needs to be adjusted to reflect
the change in the avoided net-of-carbon cost (first part) and the change in the
MEB (second part). Both, the change in cost avoided and the change in MEB,
depend on the ordering of technologies in the merit-order curve and, thus, the
correlation of the RE source with the marginal generator. In case the tax does
not lead to a re-ordering of the merit-order curve (no fuel switch), the feed-in
remains constant. In contrary, if the introduction of the tax leads to a fuel
switch, it is not a priori clear, whether the optimal feed-in needs to be higher
or lower. In the case of solar power with a high correlation with demand, we
observe two contradicting effects: First, the feed-in is likely to increase as the
carbon offset becomes larger. Second, the feed-in is likely to decrease as at least
operating-cost avoided decrease. In other words, solar now replaces more cheap
but dirty coal, and less expensive but cleaner gas generation. In the case of
wind, both effects can go in both directions as wind generation does not show
a pronounced correlation with demand. Yet, again the two effects need to be
contradicting, as high costs are correlated with low emissions and vice versa.
Which effect dominates needs to be determined empirically as it depends on the
context.
PREMIUM—–Under a premium system, RE sources receive the production
subsidy on top of the market price for electricity, Pt. In the absence of compet-
itive distortions, the electricity price equals the sum of operating and carbon
cost of the marginal generator: Pt = ct+τ ·MERt.11 The optimal RE premium,
s∗Premiumr , is set such that the MEV equals the average marginal income of the
that are another major reason to subsidize RE production. Including these additional external
benefits would increase the respective subsidy.
10Lamp & Samano (2020) include the value received from ancilliary service markets. Esti-
mating this value for PV production in Germany, they however show that this value is likely
to be small. We therefore neglect ancillary service income also because RE production was
not allowed to participate in the UK balancing mechanism.
11To introduce imperfect competition, we would need to include a markup over marginal
cost. However, for the UK power system, the “Competition and Markets Authority” (CMA,
2016) did not find evidence for anti-competitive behavior in the wholesale electricity market.
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RE producer consisting of the market income and the premium:∑
t








=⇒ s∗Premiumr = (SCC − τ) δEr (4)
As a carbon price leads to the (partial) reflection of external costs through the
market price, the optimal premium only pays a subsidy equal to the external cost
not addressed by the carbon price. This is reflected by the difference between
the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the carbon tax (τ). As long as the carbon
price is sub-optimally low (τ < SCC), the premium is positive. If carbon is
optimally priced at the SCC, there is no room for further carbon income, thus,
the premium becomes zero. In the extreme that carbon prices exceed the SCC,
the optimal premium becomes negative, i. e., RE production would need to be
taxed to avoid excess market entry by RE.











First, increasing τ leads to an increased reflection of the external cost in the
market price. Thus, the optimal premium needs to be decreased (first term).
The extend of this effect depends on the marginal emission offset δEr . Second,
if the tax induces a fuel switch, δEr itself changes (second term). The sign and
extend of the adjustments due to a change in the environmental effectiveness of
the RE source is again ambiguous. On the one hand, it depends on the sign and
magnitude of the change of δEr . As explained above, we expect the change in δ
E
r
to be positive for solar and positive or negative for wind. On the other hand,
it depends on the level of the carbon price: When carbon prices are small, the
second term is high and has the same sign as the change in δEr , i.e., a higher
emission offset implies a higher premium. With increasing carbon prices, this
adjustment motive becomes less important. When the carbon tax is higher than
the social cost of carbon, the sign of the second term reverses.
COMPARING FEED-IN TARIFF AND PREMIUM—–The major difference be-
tween the optimal feed-in and the optimal premium is the adjustment for the
external cost reflected in the market prices. If an increase in τ does not trigger
a fuel switch, the feed-in remains constant. In contrast, the premium needs to
be decreased to account for the carbon rent received through the market price
and might even become negative once the carbon price exceeds the social cost
of carbon.
On contrary, if a fuel switch occurs, both feed-in and premium, need to be
adjusted. If the environmental effectiveness increases—as we expect for solar
power—the marginal external benefit increases, which generally has an increas-
ing effect on the optimal subsidy. Yet, for the premium this effect decreases in
the tax level. For the feed-in, the decrease of avoided operating cost weakens
the effect of an increasing marginal emission offset.
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3. Empirical Framework
For our empirical applications we use data from the UK electricity sector in
the years 2015 and 2016. We choose the UK due to three major characteristics.
First, the UK had a diverse portfolio of installed capacities, including coal and
gas-fired power plants. This capacity mix allows for fuel switching as short-term
response to carbon prices. Second, the UK implemented extensive renewable
energy support (RES) schemes to promote solar and wind energy. Third, the
UK imposed a carbon tax on top of the European Emission Trading System
(EU ETS). Together with the low natural gas prices in 2016, this price induced
a fuel switch away from coal towards gas generation. It is important to note,
that the carbon tax stayed relatively constant over the whole sample period,
but due to a large variation in gas prices, we observe periods with and without
fuel switch. In concentrating on a fuel switch under constant carbon prices, we
estimate the optimal adjustment of feed-in tariffs and RE premiums due to a
re-ordering of the merit-order curve. Moreover, we estimate the carbon value
embedded in the market prices and how it changes due to changes in the merit-
order. However, as we do not observe a considerable variation in the carbon
price (see Table 3), we are not able to estimate the impact of varying carbon
prices on optimal subsidies. To illustrate the effect of carbon prices on optimal
RE promotion, we additionally use a numerical model of the UK power market
and simulate optimal RE promotion under varying carbon prices.
We proceed by reviewing climate regulations in the UK power sector followed
by explaining our econometric approach and simulation model. Finally, we
present the underlying data sources.
3.1. Renewable Support and Carbon Pricing policies in the UK
The European Renewable Energy Directive from the year 2009 (Directive
2009/29/EC) set the RE target for the UK to 15 % until 2020.12 To reach
this target, the UK implemented a variety of extensive support schemes to
promote RE generation in the power sector (see Appendix A for more detailed
information). Indeed, the large support for RE has led to a significant share of
wind and solar generation in 2015/2016 as shown in Table 1.
Next to RES policies, the UK power sector is subject to two carbon pric-
ing systems: The European Emission Trading System (EU ETS) and the UK
Carbon Price Support (CPS), an additional carbon tax on emissions stemming
from the electricity sector. The CPS complements the price for European Emis-
sion Allowances (EUA) in order to reach a minimum carbon price, the so called
Carbon Price Floor (CPF). It was announced in 2011 and introduced in 2013,
starting at a level of 4.4e/tCO2. Since the second quarter of 2015 the CPS
has been capped at a level of 18 GBP/t CO2 (about 22e/t CO2).
13 Due to the
introduction of the CPS, electricity generators in the UK face a much higher
12Although this target also includes heat and transport, the electricity sector is most impor-
tant to reach the overall target. In 2015/16 the UK exceeded the interim target of 7.5 % with
a RE share of 8.5%. The RE share in the electricity sector was around 23 % at this time
(DUKES, 2017).
13We convert the CPS rate to Euro using ECB exchange rates (ECB, 2017). The variation
observed in Table 1 stems from this pound-to-euro conversion.
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Table 1. Quarterly RE generation, fuel and carbon prices, and carbon emissions
2015 2016
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Generation [TWh]
Wind 10.11 6.69 5.84 9.81 8.81 5.95 6.63 10.49
12.7% 10.3% 9.3% 13.6% 11.7% 9.3% 10.7% 13.2%
Solar 1.06 3.58 2.93 0.85 1.42 3.44 3.43 1.51
1.3% 5.5% 4.7% 1.2% 1.9% 5.4% 5.5% 1.9%
Coal 28.70 16.60 12.63 16.53 13.69 4.05 2.28 7.96
36.0% 25.5% 20.1% 22.8% 18.2% 6.4% 3.7% 10.1%
Gas 19.65 19.63 22.57 22.50 29.95 30.58 29.03 37.69
24.7% 30.1% 36.0% 31.1% 39.7% 48.0% 47.0% 47.6%
Fuel Prices [e/MWh thermal energy]
Coal 8.16 8.02 7.63 7.02 6.20 6.46 8.08 11.71
(0.38) (0.24) (0.36) (0.38) (0.23) (0.44) (0.29) (0.93)
Gas 22.02 21.19 19.74 17.25 13.51 13.54 12.47 17.98
(1.40) (0.94) (1.14) (1.40) (0.91) (1.19) (1.65) (1.59)
Carbon Prices [e/t CO2]
EUA 7.03 7.37 7.97 8.36 5.66 5.74 4.55 5.52
(0.32) (0.24) (0.25) (0.21) (0.99) (0.41) (0.27) (0.62)
CPS 12.85 25.06 25.20 25.05 23.49 22.89 21.19 20.74
(0.35) (0.37) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.25) (0.55)
Carbon Price 19.88 32.42 33.17 33.41 29.16 28.63 25.74 26.25
Carbon emissions [Mt]
Total 30.64 20.77 19.36 22.86 23.37 15.03 12.55 20.22
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Precentages indicate share in total generation.
See Appendix B for data sources and construction.
carbon price compared to the rest of Europe confronted only with the EUA
price.
Figure 3 shows the coal-to-gas price ratio with and without carbon prices,
as well as yearly coal and gas generation. As expected, in years when coal
generation is cheaper, there is more coal production. With an increasing price
ratio, more gas production is observed. The horizontal line denotes a coal-to-gas
price ratio of 0.74 at which marginal cost for coal and gas plants are on average
equal. When the ratio is larger than 0.74, gas generation is on average cheaper
than coal generation.14 It becomes evident that except for a short period in
September 2016, carbon prices have been crucial to exceed the threshold value
of 0.74 to achieve an average fuel switch. Yet, it is also important to note, that
the carbon price was relatively stable over the whole sample period. It was much
more the gas prices that decreased in 2016, and thus—in combination with the
high carbon prices—allowed for a fuel switch.
3.2. Model of the UK Power Market
In the UK power market, power plants bid supply into the wholesale market.
Assuming perfect competition,15 power plant i bids the capacity available in
14See Section 3.3 for more details on the calculation of the fuel price ratio.
15CMA (2016) did not find evidence for anti-competitive behavior in the wholesale electricity
market.
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Figure 3. Fossil generation and fuel price ratios
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Notes: Generation of coal and gas-fired plants is measured on the left axis. The right axis
measures the coal-to-gas price ratio with and without carbon prices. For data sources and
construction see Appendix B.







CO2 , qit, qi(t−1)
)
(6)
The heat efficiency ηit indicates the conversion efficiency, i. e., how much fuel is
needed to produce a unit of electricity. It is time-depended, as it depends on
ambient temperature. pfi and p
CO2 denote the fuel and carbon price faced by
plant i. Due to ramping constraints and start-up costs, power plant costs might
be dynamic (Mansur, 2008; Reguant, 2014). Marginal cost therefore depend on
the plants’ contemporaneous (qit) and past generation qi(t−1).
Production from wind and solar plants, wt and st have near-zero marginal
cost. Thus RE generation is always used before dispatching conventional plants.
To meet hourly demand dt net of renewable generation and provided the bids,
i. e., kit and cit, of conventional power plant i, the system operator chooses














qit = dt − wt − st ∀t
kit ≥ qit ∀i, t
Solving (7) leads to setting up the merit-order curve for each hour (see Figure
1). The result determines the generation of each power plant as a function of de-














In the econometric approach, we are interested in estimating how a fuel
switch affects the abatement impact of wind and solar power. To this end,
we distinguish between two regimes (see Figure 3): In the cheap coal regime,
coal generation is on average cheaper than gas. In the fuel switch regime, gas-
fired plants are on average cheaper than coal-fired ones. However, as we do
not observe emissions directly, we first estimate the replacement of coal and
gas generation induced by wind and solar generation. We then evaluate this
replacement using average heat efficiencies and emission factors to determine
emissions avoided.
We estimate the replacement of conventional generation on the technology




(αφ̃ + β1wiφ̃wt + β1siφ̃st + β2iφ̃dt + β3iφ̃φt+
β4iφ̃tempt + β5ikt + γiVt)Itφ̃ + δiDt + εit, (9)
where β1wiφ̃ and β1siφ̃ are our main coefficients of interest measuring the re-
placement effect of wind and solar generation for the two fossil technologies
and regimes. Demand is measured as final demand net of base-load generation
(mainly hydro and nuclear power in the case of the UK) and imports/exports.
Generation depends on both, own and other plants costs and available capacity,
we thus include the vector of hourly available capacities kt and the carbon price





where pcoal and pgas are fuel prices, pcarb is the carbon price consisting of
EUA and CPS prices, and θfueli is the fuel-specific emission factor per MWh of
thermal energy.16 As we do not observe the time variation of heat efficiencies,
we include temperature (temp) as an indicator. To control for start-up and
ramping costs as well as dynamic constraints, we include lagged terms of coal
and gas generation and all contemporaneous controls over the previous 12 hours,
Vt.
Table 2 gives an overview of all variables included in the estimation. Data
sources and construction are described in Appendix B.
The specification (9) allows coefficients to vary across the two different
regimes: φ̃ ∈ {cheap coal, fuel switch}. Given an average heat efficiency of
0.38 and 0.51 for coal and gas plants, respectively (see Appendix B), gas plants
160.34 t CO2/MWhth for coal and 0.20 t CO2/MWhth for gas (IPCC, 2006).
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Table 2. Variable description
Variable Description
Dependent variable
qit Hourly generation of technology i [MWh]
Contemporaneous variables
wt Hourly wind generation [MWh]
st Hourly solar generation [MWh]
dt Hourly electricity demand [MWh]
tempt Daily mean temperature [◦C]
φt Daily coal-to-gas price ratio
kit Hourly available capacity of technology i [MW]
Lagged variables Vt (T=1,...,12)
qi(t−T ) and q−i(t−T ) Fossil generation lagged T hours
wt−T Wind generation lagged T hours
st−T Solar generation lagged T hours
dt−T Demand lagged T hours
tempt−T Temperature lagged T hours
φt−T Coal-to-gas price ratio lagged T hours
ki(t−T ) and k−i(t−T ) Available capacities lagged T hours
Notes: The sample period covers the years 2015 and 2016.
are on average cheaper at a price ratio above 0.74.17
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS—–We analyze the robustness of our regression results
along three dimensions. First, to control for unobserved variables which vary
at an hourly or monthly level we allow for time fixed effects Dt including a
dummy for each hour of the day, for each month in the year, or each month of
the sample year, respectively. In our preferred specification we do not include
fixed effects.
Second, our threshold price ratio of 0.74 is based on average heat efficiencies
and, thus, not a precise estimate of the ratio on average causing a fuel switch.
We therefore analyze how robust the results are to altering the threshold value
to 0.7 and 0.8, respectively.
Third, the effects of RE on conventional generation might be non-linear and
vary with the magnitude of demand and RE generation. Whereas our core spec-
ification is linear, we examine several non-linear specifications. First, we allow
for quadratic and cubic terms of RE generation and demand. Second, we esti-
mate two semi-parametric estimations to allow coefficients to alter by demand
and RE level. In Appendix C we provide more details on each specification.
IDENTIFICATION AND EXOGENEITY ASSUMPTIONS—–For the identification
of our main coefficients of interest, β1riφ̃ and β1siφ̃, we rely on the exogenous
hourly variation of wind and solar generation and demand. To consistently esti-
mate the model, all explanatory variables need to be independent: In the short-
run, temperature and RE generation are exogenously determined by weather
conditions. To ensure the exogeneity of demand, we need to rely on the as-
sumption of inelastic electricity demand. This assumption seems to be plau-
sible given the short-run nature of our approach. In the short-run demand is
















determined by economic activities and weather conditions and does not react
to changes in the wholesale market price. Regarding the independence of fuel
prices we argue that the UK market is too small to have a significant impact on
international coal and natural gas prices. The CPS price is fixed at least two
years in advance by the UK government, i. e., can be assumed to be exogenous
in the short-run. Verified emissions caused by fuel combustion in the UK in the
year 2015 accounted for only 6.6% of total emissions regulated under the EU
ETS.18 Thus, we also assume that the EUA price is exogenous. Finally, hourly
available capacities describe the maximal amount of energy that a plant is able
to deliver in a given hour. Therefore, they are also exogenous in the short-run.
3.4. Numerical Approach
The numerical model models generation of each gas and coal power plant
in the UK market. Following the approach outlined in Section 3.2, we need to
specify the cost function to be able to implement a numerical model. Relying
on the observed average heat efficiencies of each plant (ηi) and the carbon price












The first part expresses carbon cost inclusive operation cost determined by
the carbon cost inclusive fuel price and the heat efficiency. The second part
introduces additional cost caused by an increase in generation, so called ramping
cost. q+it denotes the increase in generation compared to the previous period.
This ramping causes cost in two different forms. First c+i are cost caused by
additional depreciation due to increased thermal stress. Second, cf+i indicates
additional fuel cost to increase generation and, thus, is evaluated at the current
carbon inclusive fuel price.























qit = dt − wt − st ∀t
kit ≥ qit ∀i, t
q+it ≥ qit − qi(t−1) ∀i, t
The last equation together with the non-negativity constraint for ramping q+it
implements the dynamic cost component due to ramping.19 The model is imple-
18Using the EU ETS viewer of the European Environmental Agency (https://www.eea.
europa.eu/data-and-maps/dashboards/emissions-trading-viewer-1) for the year 2015, UK
emissions from combustion of fossil fuels (including industry combustion) was 131 MtCO2
whereas total emissions under the EU ETS summed up to 1978 MtCO2.
19We do not include further dynamic cost components such start-up cost, minimum down-
time, or minimum generation constraint. All of these components would require model for-
mulations using binary decision variables, i.e., combinatorial optimization. Given that we
model two years in hourly resolution, such approaches are computationally rather expensive.
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ment in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software and solved
as a linear problem using the CPLEX solver.
The program solves (12) for the optimal generation schedule of each power
plant. The simulated hourly electricity price is provided as the shadow value
of the market clearing equation (first constraint). We then derive the marginal
plant as the plant with the minimum difference between the market price and
the static fuel cost component.20 Knowing the marginal generator, we know the
marginal emission rate and avoided cost in each hour. Using equations (2) and
(4), we then derive the optimal feed-in and premium.
3.5. Data
Appendix B lists all data sources and describes the construction of each
variable used in detail. For our estimation approach, we distinguish between
two fuel price regimes. In the cheap coal regime, coal generation is on average
cheaper than gas generation, in the fuel switch regime gas is cheaper. Table 3
compares hourly means and standard deviations of all variables across the two
regimes.
By construction, the values of the carbon price inclusive coal-to-gas price
ratio are lower in the cheap coal regime, and significantly higher in the fuel
switch regime. Also the carbon price exclusive fuel price ratio is higher in the
fuel switch case due to lower gas prices. However, it remains below the threshold
level of 0.74, indicating that—on average—coal generation was always cheaper
than gas in the absence of a carbon price. Coal and carbon prices are nearly
constant across the two regimes whereas gas prices are significantly lower in the
fuel switch regime.
The other variables that show large differences in means between the two
regimes are coal and gas generation: Coal generation is around twice as high in
the cheap coal regime. Gas generation, on the other hand, is higher in the fuel
switch regime. This difference is expected as the regime switch leads to a switch
in the merit order, and therefore to a replacement of coal by gas generation.
Furthermore, coal capacity is clearly lower in the high price ratio regime.
This is the case as the high price period almost exclusively comprises data of
2016, when several coal plants have been shut-down. It is therefore important
to control for these changes in our estimation approach.
Finally, demand and RE generation as well as temperature are rather similar
across the two regimes.
4. The Impact of Fuel Switching on Renewable Energy Support
Furthermore, we model power plants and not single power plant blocks. In an alternative
approach, we included ramp-rate restrictions. However, these restrictions did not significantly
alter the results. Thus, we exclude them here. The code implementing the numerical model,
which is available on request, still allows for these restrictions.
20Due to the inclusion of ramping cost, the markup over marginal cost, i.e., the difference
between the price and the static marginal cost, is not only the capacity rent but also includes
the value of generation due to possibly avoided ramping cost. These avoided ramping cost are
formally derived as the differences of the shadow value of the last constraint in (12) between
subsequent periods. Thus, there are possibly multiple plants with a positive markup over pure
static marginal cost.
17
Table 3. Comparison of variables across fuel price regimes.
cheap coal fuel switch Difference
φ < φ̂ φ ≥ φ̂
Observation [#] 6816 10726 3910
Fuel price ratio 0.66 0.87 0.20
(incl. carbon price) (0.06) (0.08) 0.00
Fuel price ratio 0.38 0.54 0.16
(w/o carbon price) (0.01) (0.11) 0.00
Coal price 7.87 7.94 0.06
(0.47) (2.10) (0.01)
Gas price 20.92 14.84 -6.07
(1.48) (2.55) (0.02)
Carbon price 28.71 28.53 -0.18
(6.04) (2.81) (0.04)
Electricity price 41.41 39.84 -1.57
(9.77) (29.04) (0.15)
Coal generation [MWh] 8533 3926 -4607
(3538) (3180) (26)
Gas generation [MWh] 9439 13213 3774
(4360) (4986) (36)
Demand [MWh] 22491 21962 -528
(6795) (7084) (53)
Wind generation [MWh] 3405 3833 428
(2183) (2980) (20)
Solar generation [MWh] 1114 991 -123
(1582) (1556) (12)
Coal available capacity [MW] 12451 9559 -2892
(2626) (4040) (25)
Gas available capacity [MW] 17419 17732 313
(1647) (1177) (11)
Temperature 9.45 9.73 0.28
(3.81) (4.31) (0.03)
Notes: Values show hourly means with standard deviations in parentheses. The threshold
value φ̂ = 0.74 marks the critical coal-to-gas price ratio above which gas generation is on
average cheaper than coal generation.
18
4.1. Fuel Switch and Fossil Generation Displacement
ESTIMATION RESULTS —–Table 4 presents the estimation results from equa-
tion (9) per technology. As we allow the coefficients to vary between fuel price
ratio regimes, there are two different coefficients for each variable. The left
(right) two columns show results for coal (gas) generation depending on the
respective regime.
All coefficients except those on the fuel price ratio and temperature are
significant and show the expected signs: RE generation leads to a decrease of
coal and gas generation. Generation of both technologies increase in demand
but this effect is three times larger for gas than for coal generation. An increased
availability of the own capacity leads to an increase in generation whereas the
availability of the other technology’s capacity decreases generation. Coefficients
on the fuel price ratio are not significant most likely as most of the impact of
the ratio on generation is already covered by allowing the coefficients to vary
between the two price regimes.21 Coefficients on temperature are not significant.
Table 4. Detailed regression results for main specification.
Coal Gas
Regime Cheap Coal Fuel Switch Cheap Coal Fuel Switch
Wind -0.2409*** -0.2307*** -0.7591*** -0.7693***
(0.0297) (0.0145) (0.0297) (0.0145)
Solar -0.2776*** -0.3468*** -0.7224*** -0.6532***
(0.0208) (0.0170) (0.0208) (0.0170)
Demand 0.2572*** -0.2400*** 0.7428*** 0.7600***
(0.0067) (0.0044) (0.0067) (0.0044)
Capacity gas -0.0840*** -0.0614*** 0.0840*** 0.0614***
(0.0286) (0.0089) (0.0286) (0.0089)
Capacity coal 0.2185*** 0.1952*** -0.2185*** -0.1952***
(0.0249) (0.0177) (0.0249) (0.0177)
Temperature -8.6380 6.0100 8.6380 -6.0100
(10.0917) (5.2625) (10.0917) (5.2625)
Ratio -1170.7985 -97.9131 1170.7958 97.9131
(864.7601) (433.2517) (864.7601) (433.2517)
Lagged variables yes yes
R-squared 0.995 0.997
Observations 17495 17495
Notes: Table shows the regression results of equation (9). The coefficients on RE denote
the replacement of fossil generation in MWh induced by one MWh of wind and solar power,
respectively. Cheap Coal refers to periods in which the coal-to-gas price ratio is below 0.74;
Fuel Switch to the remaining periods. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗: Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
GENERATION IMPACT OF RE—–The average marginal replacement of coal
and gas generation by RE production for each fuel price regime is given by the
21Nevertheless the sign is as expected: An increase in the coal-to-gas price ratio, makes coal
relatively more expensive. Therefore, the coefficient is positive for gas and negative for gas
generation. Comparing these coefficients across the two fuel price regimes, we observe that
the impact is higher for the cheap coal regime. This can be explained by the re-ordering of
the merit-order curve in the fuel switch regime: As coal already moved to the right in the
merit-order curve, an increase of the relative coal price does not induce a further change (see
Figure 1).
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wind and solar coefficients:
δQ
irφ̃
= β1riφ̃ ∀φ̃, i, r, (13)
where r denotes the renewable source, i. e., r ∈ {w, s}. I.e., the wind and solar
coefficients in Table 4 show the change in coal and gas generation induced by
an additional MWh of RE production.
Three major insights evolve. First, independent of the fuel price regime, one
MWh RE production replaces in total one MWh of fossil generation, i.e., the
impacts on coal and gas generation sum to one. This is expected as we assume
demand to be inelastic in the short run. Thus, an increase of RE production
leads to a decrease of fossil production of the same magnitude.
Second, gas shows a higher reaction to increasing RE generation than coal.
This has most likely two reasons. On the one hand, the available capacity as
well as observed generation is higher for gas-fired plants throughout our sample
period (see Table 3). On the other hand, gas is expected to be the more flexible
technology, and thus more likely to react to a change in residual demand due
to lower dynamic cost components.
Third, moving from the cheap coal to the fuel switch regime, solar generation
replaces more coal. For wind power we observe the opposite: a fuel switch leads
to a higher displacement of gas but less coal generation. However, the effect
is much less pronounced for wind than for solar. This highlights the profile
effect induced through the change in the merit-order curve. Under fuel switch,
coal generation becomes relatively more expensive, and thus moves to the right
in the supply curve. In high demand hours, coal is therefore at the margin.
As solar production coincides with high demand hours, solar becomes more
effective in reducing coal generation (see Figure 2). The rather flat profile of
wind generation explains the less pronounced reaction in the displacement of
fossil generation. Wind is also available in night hours when under a fuel switch
gas is likely to be at the margin. Thus, in the case of the UK a fuel switch leads
to less coal but more gas replacement by wind power.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS —–As described in Section 3.3 and in greater detail in
Appendix C we provide a set of sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our
results. Table C.2 shows the replacement effect of wind and solar power on coal
and gas generation per regime (δQ
irφ̃
). Overall, the replacement effects are stable
across all specifications. A more detailed discussion including a comparison with
the numerical results is provided in Appendix C.
4.2. Emission Offset and Optimal Renewable Promotion
IMPACT OF RE ON CARBON EMISSIONS—–Using average emission coefficients,












Table 5 shows that under cheap coal, solar power reduces emissions by
0.52 tCO2/MWh. Once a fuel switch is achieved, the marginal carbon offset
by solar energy slightly increases by 8% to 0.56 tCO2 per MWh. In contrast,
the emissions impact of wind does (almost) not depend on the regime. On
average it amounts to 0.50 tCO2/MWh in both regimes.
The impact of the fuel switch on the marginal emission offset mimics the
generation displacement effects. As the carbon price leads to a re-ordering of
the supply curve with coal-fired plants moving to the right, solar power which
is available in high demand hours becomes more effective. In contrast, wind
shows almost no change in the replacement, and thus emissions impact.
Table 5. Emission and cost results per RE technology and regime
Solar Wind
Cheap Coal Fuel Switch Cheap Coal Fuel Switch
Marginal Emission Offset δEr -0.52 -0.56 -0.50 -0.50
[tCO2/MWh] (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Cost and Benefit [e/MWh]
Marginal Ext. Benefit 26.08 27.84 25.14 24.88
Market Income 43.29 38.35 40.47 38.81
Ext. Cost in Market Price 14.98 15.89 14.44 14.20
Avoided Operating Cost 28.31 22.46 26.03 24.61
Optimal Subsidy [e/MWh]
Optimal Feed-in 54.39 50.30 51.17 49.49
Optimal RE premium 11.10 11.95 10.70 10.68
Notes: The marginal emssion offset is calculated according to equation (14). The marginal
external benefit evaluates the marginal emission offset at a social cost of carbon of 50e/tCO2.
The carbon value in the market price is derived as the average carbon price in the respective
regime evaluated at the marginal emission offset. The optimal premium is the marginal
external benefit net of the carbon value obtained through the market income (see equation 4).
The optimal feed-in tariff is derived as the sum of operating cost avoided and the marginal
external benefit (see equation 2). Cheap Coal refers to periods in which the coal-to-gas price
ratio is below 0.74; Fuel Switch to the remaining periods.
22Average carbon coefficients ei, are 0.38 t CO2/MWh for gas and 0.89 t CO2/MWh for
coal, respectively. In reality, heat efficiencies, and therefore carbon emissions, depend on
temperature, start-up and ramping of plants, i. e. they are not constant over time. As we do
not observe hourly heat efficiencies or emissions, we use average emission coefficients for our
analyses. This has the following implications: First, assuming that the infeed of RE leads to
more fluctuations, and consequently ramping and start-ups, heat efficiencies are lower in times
with high RE infeed. By using average heat efficiencies, we therefore tend to overestimate
the impact on emissions. Second, solar energy is correlated with times of high temperatures
during midday and summer when also heat efficiencies are low. Using average heat-efficiencies
we, again, tend to overestimate the impact. Wind generation, on the other side, is higher in
winter when heat efficiencies are high. Hence, in this case, we tend to underestimate the
impact on emissions.
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CONSEQUENCES FOR OPTIMAL RENEWABLE PROMOTION—–The optimal feed-
in tariff is given as the sum of the marginal external benefit (MEB) and the
operating cost avoided (equation 2). In contrast, the optimal RE premium is
equal to the MEB net of the carbon value received through the market price
(equation 4). Table 5 shows the optimal subsidies together with their different
components which are presented in Figure 4 in a graphical way. Using a value of
50 e/tCO2 for the social cost of carbon (SCC ) (Gillingham, 2019), we calculate
the MEB as the product of the RE specific emission offset and the social cost of
carbon (SCC · δEr ). We further calculate external cost reflected in the market
prices as the product of the carbon price and the emission offset (τ · δEr ). Oper-
ating cost avoided are then calculated as the market income net of the external
cost embedded in the price; where the market income given by the weighted
average of the market prices using the RE profile as weight (
∑
t ωrt · Pt).
Figure 4. Optimal renewable production subsidies
Notes: Shown are the optimal feed-in and premium values for solar and wind power depending
on the fuel price regime. Single bars subdivide each subsidy into its components.
Considering the level of optimal subsidies, we make three major observa-
tions. First, the optimal premium and feed-in do not show a large variation
across RE sources. Optimal feed-in tariffs lie between 49 and 54e/MWh. Pre-
miums are substantially lower in the order of 11 to 12e/MWh. This confirms
earlier results by Callaway et al. (2018) for the US and Abrell et al. (2019c) for
Germany: Different production profiles of RE sources do not require a substan-
tial differentiation of RE subsidies across RE sources.
Second, external cost reflected in the market price due to the carbon tax
(grey boxes in Figure 4) substantially reduce RE premiums. Without a carbon
price, the optimal premium would be equal to the MEB. In our sample period,
the average carbon price was about 28.50 e/tCO2 (see Table 3) leading to
a substantial carbon value embedded in the market price. This reflection of
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external cost decreases the optimal premium to less than half of the MEB, i. e.,
from 25 - 28 to 10 - 11e/MWh.
Third, feed-in tariffs do not show a large variation across fuel price regimes.
A fuel switch requires adjusting the optimal feed-in by less than 8% downward.
Also the adjustment of optimal premiums is relatively small. For solar, the
optimal premium increases by about 8% as response to the re-ordering of the
merit-order curve due to a fuel switch. In contrast, the optimal wind premium
remains constant.
What drives the adjustments of the optimal subsidy rates? For the case of
solar power, the fuel switch leads to an increase of the environmental effective-
ness as more carbon-intense coal generation is substituted. Consequently, the
MEB increases, demanding an increase in the optimal premium. However, the
re-ordering of the merit-order curve also implies that solar power receives an
increased carbon value embedded in the market price. This dampens the effect
of the increasing MEB (see equation 5). As the environmental effectiveness of
solar increases and as the carbon price is below the SCC, the overall effect is
positive leading to an increase of the optimal premium by about 1 e/MWh or
8%. In contrast, the optimal solar feed-in decreases by 4 e/MWh (8%). Under
the fuel switch, coal plants move to the right in the merit-order which leads to
a decrease in avoided operating cost. This decrease outweighs the effect of an
increasing MEB.
For wind power, the fuel switch does not change the environmental effective-
ness. Thus also the MEB, the carbon value received through the market income,
and consequently the optimal premium remain almost constant. Avoided oper-
ating cost slightly decrease as gas prices are significantly lower in this regime.
Consequently, as operating cost avoided slightly decrease while the MEB re-
mains (almost) constant, the optimal wind feed-in tariff slightly decreases by
1.70 e/MWh (3%).
Comparing wind and solar subsidy rates, we observe that RE premiums
naturally mimic the ranking imposed by environmental effectiveness. Under
cheap coal, solar is less effective and, thus, receives a smaller premium. Once a
fuel switch is achieved, the marginal emissions offset of solar power increases,
leading to a higher optimal premium. These adjustments are driven by the
environmental effectiveness, and the difference between carbon prices and the
SCC. However, as carbon prices remain almost constant over the two periods,
the impact of the latter is negligible. In contrast, feed-in tariffs are not directly
affected by the carbon price, but only through its impact on the merit-order.
However, under a feed-in system, adjustments are also driven by fuel prices as
they impact operating cost avoided. Consequently, the ordering of technologies
using environmental effectiveness does not necessarily reflect the ordering of
feed-in tariffs.
Summarizing, our empirical analysis provides three main findings. First,
the carbon value received through the market price substantially reduces the
optimal RE premium. Second, optimal feed-in tariffs and premiums need to
be adjusted to account for a fuel-switch. This adjustment is rather small in
absolute terms. In relative terms, it is larger for RE premiums than for feed-
in tariffs. Third, we find some variation of environmental effectiveness across
RE sources. The differentiation of optimal subsidy rates across RE sources is,
however, rather modest.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS—–Table 6 shows the optimal feed-in tariffs and opti-
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mal premiums for the different specifications. Given that the replacement effects
of wind and solar are stable across specifications (see Appendix C), also the
optimal subsidies are very robust to varying econometric specifications. More-
over, the results from the numerical model are also similar but slightly differ in
size. Relative subsidy adjustments triggered by a fuel switch are the same in
the numerical and the econometric approach but adjustments in the numerical
approach are slightly more pronounced.23
Table 6. Optimal subsidy per RE technology and regime [e/MWh] for different
specifications and numerical model results
Solar Wind
Cheap Coal Fuel Switch Cheap Coal Fuel Switch
Optimal feed-in
Main Specification 54.39 50.30 51.17 49.49
Specifications with time fixed effects
Hour FE 54.21 50.08 51.10 49.49
Month FE 54.30 50.19 51.18 49.51
MonthxYear FE 54.29 50.14 51.18 49.49
Specifications with different threshold levels φ̂
φ̂ = 0.7 53.80 50.21 51.16 49.58
φ̂ = 0.8 54.80 50.03 51.24 49.33
Flexible and semi-parametric specifications
Polynomials 55.08 50.77 51.27 49.74
RE Quintiles 54.40 50.30 51.31 49.51
Demand Quintiles 54.49 50.02 51.15 49.51
Simulation Model 59.97 54.67 61.26 55.81
Optimal RE premium
Main Specification 11.10 11.95 10.70 10.68
Specifications with time fixed effects
Hour FE 10.93 11.73 10.63 10.68
Month FE 11.01 11.84 10.71 10.70
MonthxYear FE 11.00 11.79 10.71 10.69
Specifications with different threshold levels φ̂
φ̂ = 0.7 10.52 11.86 10.69 10.77
φ̂ = 0.8 11.51 11.68 10.77 10.52
Flexible and semi-parametric specifications
Polynomials 11.79 12.42 10.80 10.93
RE Quintiles 11.11 11.95 10.84 10.70
Demand Quintiles 11.21 11.67 10.68 10.70
Simulation Model 8.26 11.83 12.34 12.07
Notes: The optimal premium is the marginal external benefit net of the carbon value obtained
through the market income (see equation 4). The optimal feed-in tariff is derived as the sum of
avoided operating cost and the marginal external benefit (see equation 2). Cheap Coal refers
to periods in which the coal-to-gas price ratio is below the defined threshold; Fuel Switch to
the remaining periods.
23For a more detailed discussion see Appendix C
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5. The Impact of Carbon Prices on Renewable Energy Support
Our estimation allows quantifying the impact of a fuel switch on the optimal
premium and feed-in tariff. However, as the carbon price is on average almost
equal across the two regimes (see Table 3), we are not able to show the impact
of a change of the carbon price itself. We therefore use a simulation model
(see Section 3.4) to illustrate the impact of increasing carbon prices on optimal
RE subsidies. In the following, we first describe the simulation setup and then
present the respective results.
5.1. Simulation Setup and Calculation of Optimal Subsidies
We simulate the impact of increasing carbon prices under constant fuel
prices. We keep fuel prices constant at the level observed at the beginning of
our sample. On 1 January 2015 the coal (gas) price was 8.3 (21.3) e/MWhth.
Given these prices, the merit-order curve is completely separated in the sense
that all coal-fired plants are dispatched before gas-fired ones. We then increase
the carbon price from 0 to 50 e/tCO2 in steps of 1 e. All other parameters,
in particular hourly available capacities and heat efficiencies, are kept at their
observed values. Thus, these simulations enable us to explore the impact of
carbon prices under the given set of fuel prices.
Using the simulated hourly dispatch, we calculate the marginal generator for
each hour (see Section 3.4) The individual plan characteristics of the marginal
generator then allow us to compute the marginal emissions rate (MER) as well
as operating cost avoided for each hour. Finally, we use the production profile of
RE sources (ωrt), the social cost of carbon (SCC), and hourly electricity prices
simulated by the model, to calculate the optimal feed-in and premium by RE
source according to equations (2) and (4).
5.2. Results
Figure 5 presents the marginal external benefit (MEB, black solid line) as
well as the optimal feed-in tariff (upper red line) and premium (lower red line)
derived from our simulations. Again, we distinguish between wind and solar
power. As the optimal feed-in grants a subsidy equal to the sum of the marginal
external benefit and the avoided operating cost (see equation 2), the distance
between the optimal feed-in and the MEB shows the operating cost avoided. The
distance between the MEB and the optimal premium represents the carbon rent
transferred through the market price.
MARGINAL EXTERNAL BENEFIT—–The MEB stays constant until a carbon
price of 15 e/tCO2. At this point, the most efficient gas plant (Pembroke) be-
comes cheaper than the most inefficient coal plant (Uskmouth), i.e., fuel switch-
ing begins. By further increasing the carbon price, coal-fired plants move to the
right in the merit-order curve, and we observe that the MEB of both — wind
and solar power — increases.
OPTIMAL PREMIUM—–The optimal premium is equal to the MEB net of
the carbon value embedded in the market price. As no fuel switching occurs
before a carbon price of 15 e/tCO2, the MEB is constant. Thus the optimal
premium linearly decreases, reflecting the increased carbon price component
embedded in the electricity price. Later — although the MEB slightly increases
— the premium is further decreasing in the carbon price. This implies that
the dampening effect of the carbon price signal in the market price clearly
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Figure 5. Optimal RE subsidies by carbon price
(a) Wind (b) Solar
Notes: The graph shows the marginal external benefit (solid), optimal feed-in (dashed), and
optimal premium (dotted) by carbon price resulting from the simulations for wind (left panel)
and solar (right panel) power. For each carbon price, the distance between MEB and the
feed-in indicates operating cost avoided. The distance between MEB and the premium has
the interpretation of the carbon rent transferred through the market price. The distance
between the optimal feed-in and premium, i.e., the sum of the external cost in market price
and avoided operating cost, is equal to the average market income.
outweighs the increasing effect induced by a higher environmental effectiveness.
Once carbon emissions are priced at the social cost of carbon, external costs are
fully reflected in the market price and, thus, the optimal premium is zero.
OPTIMAL FEED-IN TARIFF—–The optimal feed-in is the sum of the MEB
and the avoided operating cost. Low values of the carbon price do not alter the
merit-order curve. Thus the MEB, the operating cost avoided, and consequently
also the optimal feed-in tariff remain constant. At higher values of the carbon
price, a further increase leads to a higher optimal feed-in tariff. When coal plants
move to the right in the merit-order curve, this has two effects on the optimal
feed-in tariff: On the one hand, the marginal emission rate, and thus the MEB,
increases. On the other hand, given constant fuel prices, the avoided operating
cost (net-of-carbon) are cheaper for coal than for gas plants. Thus, operating
cost avoided decrease. Overall the increase in the MEB exceeds the dampening
effect of lower operating cost leading to a slight increase of the feed-in tariff.
The difference between the optimal premium and feed-in depicts the part of
the marginal economic benefit that RE generators are able to gain at the market
and is equal to the average market income. Due to the increasing reflection of
carbon cost, this income is increase which phases out premiums. Once carbon
is optimally priced, the average market income is equal to the optimal feed-in.
Therefore, under an optimal carbon price, there is also no need to implement
feed-in tariffs.
Summarizing, RE premiums clearly decrease in carbon prices as the reflec-
tion of external costs in the market price increases. Consequently, at high carbon
prices, RE premiums are no longer needed to foster investment into RE. Opti-
mal feed-in tariffs need only small adjustments to account for increasing carbon
prices. However, that does not necessarily imply that feed-ins do not become




For many years, renewable promotion schemes have been the predominant
policy to decarbonize the electricity sector. However, in recent years, carbon
pricing is becoming more and more popular, leading to an increase in carbon
prices. This paper addresses the question how renewable energy support (RES)
needs to be adjusted once external cost of carbon emissions are increasingly
priced. More specifically we ask: How does a carbon price change the emissions
impact of wind and solar generation? What are the implications of carbon prices
for the optimal support of RE generation?
To address these questions, we first analytically derive the optimal feed-in
tariff and RE premium under carbon pricing. We then empirically estimate the
impact of a fuel switch on RE-induced abatement using hourly data of the UK
power market for the years 2015/16. We choose the UK as it was subject to
extensive RES schemes and a high carbon tax due to the Carbon Price Support.
We calculate the optimal feed-in tariff and premium for wind and solar for a
situation with and without fuel switch. Finally, we use a numerical model of
the UK power market to derive the impact of increasing carbon prices on the
optimal RE subsidy.
The optimal feed-in reflects the emissions avoided evaluated at the social
cost of carbon as well as avoided cost of conventional generation. In contrast,
the optimal RE premium reflects only the value of avoided emissions that is
not addressed by the carbon price. Increasing carbon prices therefore require
adjusting RE subsidies due to two motives: The change in the marginal external
benefit of RE production and the increasing reflection of the external cost of
carbon in the market price.
The first motive only applies if the carbon price leads to a fuel switch. In
this case, the ordering in the market supply curve changes, leading to a change
in the marginal generator. This affects the impact of RE on emissions, i. e.,
their marginal external benefit, as well as the costs of fossil generation. Our
empirical analysis shows, that a fuel switch induces a rather modest adjustment
of optimal RE subsidies. For the UK, we estimate a maximum adjustment of
optimal premiums and feed-in tariffs of around 8%. Adjustments differ across
RE sources due to their distinct production profiles. As solar generation is
highly correlated with demand, the marginal coal offset, and thus the marginal
external benefit of solar, increases with a fuel switch. In contrast, for wind with
its profile being rather flat over the day, the estimated adjustment is negligible.
The second motive only applies to optimal premiums which decrease with
the carbon tax as the higher carbon value is reflected in the market price. Our
numerical results show that the necessary adjustment is substantial. We also
find that the decrease in the premium due to an increasing reflection of the
cost of carbon in the market price always dominate the potential increase of the
marginal external benefit induced by a fuel switch. Once carbon is optimally
priced, there is no further room for RE premiums, i.e., premiums decrease to
zero.
At the time of our analysis, the UK electricity market was characterized
by a diverse capacity mix including coal and gas-fired plants. However, many
countries do not have coal capacities installed or are about to phase-out coal-
fired plants through additional policies. What do our results imply for these
countries? As long as gas capacities exist and are at the margin, carbon pricing
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cannot induce a fuel switch. Consequently, the adjustment of RE subsidies
for a change in marginal emissions avoided is no longer required. In contrast,
adjusting RE premiums to account for increasing carbon prices is still necessary.
As feed-in tariffs do not need to be adjusted to account for external cost
in the market price, they seem to be less susceptible to the overlap of policies.
However, this stability comes at a cost: Feed-in tariffs decouple RE generation
from the wholesale electricity market. They thus need to be adjusted to reflect
avoided cost of fossil producers. In contrast, RE premiums do not need to be
adjusted for these changes as they receive the market price.
Summarizing, if policy makers increasingly rely on carbon pricing, the role of
RE support decreases. Once carbon is priced optimally, there is no more room
for RE premiums. If RE premiums are not adjusted accordingly, there is the
danger of over-investment into RE sources. Feed-in tariffs, in contrast, decouple
RE generation from the market. Thus, they do not need to be adjusted for the
carbon values embedded in the market price. However, once carbon is optimally
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Böhringer, C., & Behrens, M. (2015). Interactions of emission caps and re-
newable electricity support schemes. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 48 ,
78–98.
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Appendix A. Detailed Information on RES schemes in the UK
Small-scale generation, mostly solar photovoltaics, is mainly promoted by
feed-in tariffs (FITs) which pay a fixed price per unit of generation. The level
of contribution depends on the technology, installed capacity and the installa-
tion date (DUKES, 2017). For large-scale generation, the most important sup-
port mechanism until 2015 was the Renewable Obligations (RO) scheme. This
obliged electricity firms to sell a minimum share of RE generation—measured
against their total electricity sales. For each unit of RE generation they re-
ceived a tradable certificate. At first, each MWh of RE generation received
one certificate. Starting from 2009, the scheme was adapted and the sources
received different amounts of certificates per unit of generation—depending on
their relative maturity, development cost and associated risk (DTI, 2017). For
example, on-shore wind received less then one certificate per MWh while off-
shore wind received almost two certificates per MWh. From 2015 until 2017,
the RO scheme closed bit by bit for all RE sources and was replaced by the Con-
tract for Differences (CfD), which ensure a fixed price for renewable electricity
generation. When the wholesale market price lies below this strike price, the
generators receive the difference, when it lies above the strike price, they have
to pay the difference (Departement for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy,
2017).
Appendix B. Data Sources and Construction
In the following, we present data sources and construction of all variables
that we either use in our models or for ex-post calculations.
For coal and gas generation we use ”final physical notification” (FPN) data
provided by the operator of the UK electricity balancing system ELEXON
(2016). These data represent hourly generation of each fossil power plant unit.
FPN reports the final, 5 minutes before delivery time generation announcement
of power plant owners to the grid operator. Although the grid operator might
adjust this announcement due to the need for balancing power or re-dispatching
measures, they are a reasonable measure for generation, which is not directly
observable for UK power plants. For our analysis, we aggregate power plant
units to the technologies coal and gas.
ELEXON (2016) provides hourly RE generation. These data, however, only
report solar and wind in-feeds into to the high voltage grid. Nationalgrid (2016)
reports final demand together with an estimate of wind and solar generation
embedded in demand. Adding embedded RE generation to wind and solar gen-
eration provided by ELEXON (2016), we construct a measure of RE production.
CPS rates are reported by Hirst (2017) and HM Revenue & Customs (2014),
and the EUA price by EEX (2018). Fuel prices come from EIKON (2007). For
coal, we use the ICE CIF ARA Near Month future. Natural gas prices are NBP
Hub 1st day futures. All prices are converted to Euro using daily exchange rates
provided by ECB (2017). Note that the CPS rate is an annually constant tax in
British Pound but reflects exchange rate variations due to the Euro conversion.
Annual carbon emissions for each plant are taken from the official registry
of the EUTL (European Commission, 2016). Dividing total emissions by total
generation per technology, we obtain technology-specific average emission rates,
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Figure B.1. Carbon prices necessary to induce a fuel switch.
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Notes: The average weekly carbon price to induce a fuel switch is derived from a fuel switch
ratio of 0.74 and equation (10).
ei, which are significantly higher for coal (0.89 t CO2/MWh) than for gas (0.38 t
CO2/MWh).
Using fuel-specific emission factors θfueli per MWh of thermal energy,
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calculate average heat efficiencies per technology, ηi = θi/ei. It is 51 % for
natural gas and 38 % for coal plants.
Average heat efficiencies are used to derive the fuel price ratio that induces
a fuel switch (see Section 3.3). Figure B.1 shows the carbon prices that are
necessary to induce a fuel switch (i. e., coal-to-gas price ratio above 0.74), and
compares it to the observed carbon prices.
Installed capacities, fuel type, and plant closure dates are provided by Vari-
able Pitch (2016) and Nationalgrid (2011). In case the 95 % quantile of ob-
served generation exceeds provided installed capacity, we adjust capacity to the
95 % quantile of generation. Available hourly capacity is given by the Maximum
Export Limits (MEL) provided by ELEXON (2016), which we aggregate to the
technology level. Daily mean temperatures are provided by ECA&D (2016).
Table B.1 shows average heat efficiencies of power plants used in the numer-
ical model. Schröder et al. (2013) provide a survey on power plant cost data
including ramping cost. We use a value of 10 (1.5) e/MWstarted for coal (gas)
plants. Additional fuel use (cf+i ) is given as 6.2 (3.5) MWhtherm/MWhel.
Appendix C. Robustness Checks
To examine the sensitivity of our results with regard to several assumptions
we perform different robustness checks. First, we introduce different fixed effects
to our main specification examining the robustness with regard to unobserved
factors. Second, we examine more flexible estimations using higher order poly-
nomials and semi-parametric approaches. Third, we examine the robustness of
our results with regard to the threshold price ratio dividing the sample into
the two price regimes. Finally, we also compare the regression results against
240.34 tCO2/MWhtherm for coal and 0.20 tCO2/MWhtherm for gas (IPCC, 2006).
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Table B.1. Power Plants and Heat Efficiencies
Gas Plant Capacity Efficiency Coal Plant Capacity Efficiency
[MW] [MW]
Pembroke 2269 0.60 Longannet 2304 0.42
Staythorpe 1792 0.58 Didcot Coal 2108 0.39
Didcot CCGT 1404 0.55 Ratcliffe 2000 0.38
Connahs Quay 1380 0.48 West Burton Coal 1972 0.38
West Burton CCGT 1332 0.51 Fiddlers Ferry 1961 0.37
Grain CHP 1305 0.56 Ferrybridge 1960 0.38
South Humber 1239 0.50 Drax Coal 1947 0.38
Seabank 1169 0.55 Eggborough 1932 0.37
Saltend South 1164 0.52 Aberthaw 1641 0.41
Immingham CHP 1123 0.44 Rugeley 996 0.39
Langage 905 0.55 Uskmouth 363 0.33
Marchwood 898 0.58 Average coal plant 0.38




Sutton Bridge 796 0.52
Damhead Creek 783 0.53
Coryton 770 0.52
Little Barford 740 0.54
Rye House 715 0.43
Medway 680 0.53
Baglan Bay 520 0.57
Deeside 498 0.47
Great Yarmouth 420 0.56
Shoreham 420 0.54
Enfield Energy 408 0.53
Corby 401 0.39




Shotton CHP 210 0.46
Derwent 198 0.51
Fellside 180 0.51
Fawley Cogen 150 0.51
Grangemouth 144 0.51
Fife 123 0.51
Average gas plant 0.51
Average gas plant (weighted) 0.53
Notes: Adapted from Abrell et al. (2020) dropping plants closing before 2015. We show in-
stalled capacities as indicator whereas we use available capacity in each hour in the estimation
and numerical approach.
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a counterfactual approach using our simulation model. Table C.2 provides an
overview of the robustness results showing the RE-induced fossil replacement
for the different specifications. Overall, we conclude that our results are robust
to varying specifications. In the subsequent sections, we explain and analyze
the results of each specification in detail.
Appendix C.1. Specifications with Time Fixed Effects
To examine the impact of unobserved variables varying at the hourly or
monthly level, we include a set of time fixed effects, Dt, to our main specifica-
tion given by equation (9). We include three different time dummies: hour of
the day (Hour FE), month in the year (Month FE), and month of the sample
(MonthxYear FE), respectively.
Table C.2 shows that our results are mostly robust to the inclusion of fixed
effects. The impact of wind on coal and gas generation is (almost) not affected
by the inclusion of time fixed effects. In the case of solar, the impact of solar on
coal (gas) slightly decreases (increases) when including time fixed effects. Given
that solar has a very pronounced daily and seasonal profile, it is likely that time
fixed effects absorb some variation of solar generation.
Appendix C.2. Specifications with Alternative Threshold Levels for φ
In our main specification, the threshold level that divides the two fuel price
regimes is given by a coal-to-gas price ratio of 0.74 at which marginal cost for
coal and gas generation are on average equal. To address the sensitivity of our
results with respect to this parameter choice, we add two more specifications:
One, where we define the threshold ratio to be at 0.7; and one where it is 0.8.
Using these alternative parameters, we re-estimate equation (9).
Table C.2 shows that the impacts of wind on fossil generation are almost not
affected by a change in the threshold ratio. Only in the case of solar replace-
ment in the cheap coal regime, there is a slightly higher difference between the
specifications: A lower threshold level leads to a lower reaction of coal. This
result would be expected as a lower threshold level indicates a clearer separa-
tion between coal and gas generation in the merit-order during the cheap coal
regime. Thus, coal is only marginal in low demand hours when solar is less
active. In case of a higher threshold level, the opposite is the case, i. e., a more
mixed merit-order curve indicates that coal can also be marginal in higher de-
mand hours, increasing the impact of solar on coal. Due to its flat profile, wind
replacement is (almost) not affected by a change in the threshold ratio.
Appendix C.3. Flexible and semi-parametric specifications
To allow for non-linear effects we estimate one specification where we include
higher-order polynomials of wind and solar power as well as demand, and two
semi-parametric specifications where we allow coefficients to vary for different
RE generation and demand levels.
Appendix C.3.1. Higher order polynomials
In this specification we include second and third order polynomials of wind
and solar power as well as demand:
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Table C.2. Marginal fossil generation displacement of renewable energies
Solar Wind
Cheap Coal Fuel Switch Cheap Coal Fuel Switch
Coal
Main Specification -0.28 -0.35 -0.24 -0.23
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Specifications with time fixed effects
Hour FE -0.26 -0.33 -0.23 -0.23
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Month FE -0.27 -0.34 -0.24 -0.23
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
MonthxYear FE -0.27 -0.33 -0.24 -0.23
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Specifications with different threshold levels φ̂
φ̂ = 0.7 -0.22 -0.34 -0.24 -0.24
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
φ̂ = 0.8 -0.32 -0.32 -0.25 -0.22
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Flexible and semi-parametric specifications
Polynomials -0.31 -0.39 -0.27 -0.24
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
RE Quintiles -0.28 -0.35 -0.25 -0.23
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Demand Quintiles -0.29 -0.32 -0.24 -0.23
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Simulation Model -0.12 -0.26 -0.37 -0.37
Gas
Main Specification -0.72 -0.65 -0.76 -0.77
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Specifications with time fixed effects
Hour FE -0.74 -0.67 -0.77 -0.77
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Month FE -0.73 -0.66 -0.76 -0.77
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
MonthxYear FE -0.73 -0.67 -0.76 -0.77
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Specifications with different threshold levels φ̂
φ̂ = 0.7 -0.78 -0.66 -0.76 -0.76
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
φ̂ = 0.8 -0.68 -0.68 -0.75 -0.78
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Flexible and semi-parametric specifications
Polynomials -0.69 -0.61 -0.73 -0.76
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
RE Quintiles -0.72 -0.65 -0.75 -0.77
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Demand Quintiles -0.71 -0.68 -0.76 -0.77
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Simulation Model -0.88 -0.74 -0.63 -0.63
Notes: Table shows the replacement of fossil generation in MWh induced by one MWh of wind
and solar power, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Cheap Coal refers



















t + β7iφ̃φt + β8iφ̃tempt + γikt + γiVt)Itφ̃ + εit
(C.1)
We calculate the average marginal replacement of coal and gas generation
by RE production for each fuel price regime as the partial derivative of qit and






= β1riφ̃ + 2β2riφ̃rφ̃ + 3β3riφ̃rφ̃
2 ∀φ̃, i, r (C.2)
Table C.2 shows that the replacement effect of wind and solar on coal (gas)
is slightly higher (lower) for the specification including polynomials as compared
to the main specification given by equation (9).
Appendix C.3.2. Semi-parametric: Coefficients vary by demand
In this specification, we allow coefficients of wind and solar power and de-
mand to vary flexibly by demand level dividing hourly demand into five separate
bins corresponding to the quintiles of the demand distribution. This allows us
to analyze to what extent our results depend on demand levels. With Binp(dt)
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)
Itφ̃ + εit (C.3)
We can then calculate the average marginal replacement effect as the mean









Figure C.2 shows how the replacement effect depends on demand levels. We
find that the results only vary slightly across demand levels. However, there is
a larger variation in the case of solar as compared to wind and the difference
in replacement impacts between the two regimes is most pronounced in the
highest demand percentile, where solar is mostly active. In all cases, the semi-
parametric estimates of the replacement effect of wind and solar include the
core estimate of the main specification (dotted lines).
Appendix C.3.3. Coefficients vary by renewable energy generation
Similarly, we estimate a semi-parametric model, where we allow the coeffi-
cients of wind and solar power and demand to vary flexibly by RE generation
level. Here, we aggregate wind and solar power to total RE generation (re)
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Cheap coal Fuel switch
Notes: Dotted lines show the estimates of our main specification (equation 9).
and divide hourly RE generation into five separate bins corresponding to the
quintiles of its distribution. With Binp(ret) as indicator representing the pth








αφ̃p + β1wiφ̃pwt + β1siφ̃pst + β2iφ̃pdt
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β3iφ̃φt + β4iφ̃tempt + γikt + γiVt
)
Itφ̃ + εit (C.5)










Figure C.3 shows how the replacement effect depends on the renewable gen-
eration level (given as the sum of solar and wind generation). As in the case of
demand, results only slightly vary by RE quintile and the the semi-parametric
estimates include the core estimate of our main specification (dotted lines).
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Cheap coal Fuel switch
Notes: Dotted lines show the estimates of our main specification (equation 9).
Appendix C.4. Comparing results from empirical analysis and numerical model
In addition, we also provide the estimates resulting from our numerical model
(described in Section 3.4). To this end, we simulate hourly market clearing
under observed prices, available capacities, demand, and renewable generation.
For each hour, we obtain the simulated electricity price as well as the marginal
generator. We then calculate the optimal RE subsidies as averages of hourly
effects for the two fuel price regimes.
Comparing the coal generation offsets of the main econometric specification
and the numerical results, several insights emerge. First, the simulation results
generally show a lower impact of solar on coal generation but a higher impact of
wind on coal generation. Second, as in the econometric approach a fuel switch
leads to an increased offset of coal generation by solar power. For wind power,
however, the coal offsets by wind power is invariant to a fuel switch whereas the
econometric approach shows a slight decrease. This confirms the intuition that
due to the rather flat production profile of wind, the effect of a fuel switch on
the generation offset of wind power is rather ambiguous.
Regarding the subsidy results of the numerical model (see Table 6), several
things are noteworthy: First, compared to the estimates resulting from the
regressions, subsidies are of similar size. Optimal feed-in tariffs are higher for
both RE sources. Premiums are slightly lower in the case of solar and higher
in the case of wind. Second, the relative adjustment of subsidies due to a fuel
switch is consistent across the two approaches. Solar feed-ins decrease whereas
premiums are increasing. For wind, feed-in and premiums decrease. Third,
adjustments derived from the numerical model are somewhat larger than those
derived from the econometric model.
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